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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-4448 
___________ 
 
ERIC D. NORRIS, 
 
                                                     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MARILYN BROOKS; THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY  
OF THE COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA;  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-06-cv-05509) 
District Judge:  Honorable Stewart Dalzell 
___________ 
 
Argued June 2, 2015 
 
Before:  RENDELL, HARDIMAN and VANASKIE,  
Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: July 27, 2015) 
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Arianna J. Freeman (Argued) 
Federal Community Defender Office for the Eastern District 
 of Pennsylvania 
601 Walnut Street 
The Curtis Center, Suite 540 West 
Philadelphia, PA 19106 
 Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant 
 
Susan E. Affronti (Argued) 
Molly S. Lorber 
Philadelphia County Office of District Attorney 
3 South Penn Square 
Philadelphia, PA 19107 
 Attorneys for Respondents-Appellees 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Eric Norris, a state prisoner in Pennsylvania, petitioned 
for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 2007. The District 
Court denied the petition, holding that his claim of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel was procedurally defaulted during 
collateral relief proceedings in state court. In 2012, Norris 
filed a motion for relief from judgment invoking Martinez v. 
Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), which held that attorney error 
in collateral proceedings may sometimes excuse the 
procedural default of a habeas petitioner’s ineffective 
assistance claim. The District Court denied his motion, and 
Norris appeals. 
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I 
 Norris was arrested by Philadelphia police in June 
1999 for committing an aggravated assault about a year 
earlier. His trial began in the Court of Common Pleas of 
Philadelphia County in August 2001 and ended in a 
conviction. At the conclusion of the trial, Norris complained 
that his counsel had been ineffective, and the court appointed 
new counsel to argue post-verdict motions. That attorney 
lodged several claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
on Norris’s behalf, all of which the trial court rejected in 
December 2001. Norris was ultimately sentenced to 25–50 
years’ imprisonment pursuant to Pennsylvania’s “three 
strikes” law.  
 In June 2003, Norris filed a pro se petition for 
collateral relief in the Court of Common Pleas pursuant to 
Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 9501 et seq., asserting that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to seek dismissal of the charges on 
speedy trial grounds. The court then appointed new counsel, 
J. Matthew Wolfe, who filed an amended PCRA petition on 
behalf of Norris. The amended petition made claims of newly 
discovered evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel, 
including a reassertion of the claim that trial counsel had been 
ineffective for not seeking dismissal of the charges on speedy 
trial grounds. The petition asserted that more than three years 
elapsed between the issuance of the criminal complaint and 
the beginning of Norris’s trial and argued that this delay 
violated a state procedural rule and the Sixth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution. The Court of Common Pleas 
disagreed and dismissed the petition, ruling in pertinent part 
that the speedy trial issue could not support an ineffective 
assistance claim because it lacked merit.  
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 In November 2005, Wolfe filed an appeal in the 
Superior Court of Pennsylvania and abandoned the speedy 
trial argument despite Norris’s insistence that it be included. 
In two pro se filings, Norris presented the speedy trial 
argument himself and accused Wolfe of providing ineffective 
assistance. The Superior Court then directed Wolfe to file a 
petition for remand analyzing Norris’s contentions in order to 
help the court determine whether to remand the case for 
appointment of new counsel. See Commonwealth v. Battle, 
879 A.2d 266, 268–69 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (describing the 
Superior Court’s procedure for handling pro se filings by 
counseled litigants), abrogated by Commonwealth v. Jette, 23 
A.3d 1032 (Pa. 2011). The court eventually denied the 
petition for remand and affirmed the dismissal of the PCRA 
petition, holding that the speedy trial issue was waived 
because it was not included in Norris’s counseled brief and 
that Wolfe had not provided ineffective assistance by 
declining to make that argument. The Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania denied review. Commonwealth v. Norris, 909 
A.2d 1289 (2006). 
 Norris filed a habeas petition in the District Court in 
2007. The sole basis for his petition was the claim that his 
trial and direct appeal counsel were ineffective in failing to 
raise the speedy trial issue. The Commonwealth responded 
that this claim was procedurally defaulted on PCRA appeal 
and was meritless in any event. In June 2007, the District 
Court adopted a magistrate judge’s recommendation that the 
petition be denied because of a procedural default.  
 In March 2012, the Supreme Court decided Martinez, 
holding that “[i]nadequate assistance of counsel at initial-
review collateral proceedings may establish cause for a 
prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineffective 
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assistance at trial.” 132 S. Ct. at 1315. Less than two months 
later, Norris filed a motion for relief from judgment under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), arguing that Martinez 
excused the procedural default of his ineffective assistance 
claim. The Court denied his motion on three grounds: (1) 
Martinez did not apply because Norris’s claim was 
abandoned on collateral appeal, not initial collateral review; 
(2) Martinez alone was not an “extraordinary circumstance” 
justifying relief from judgment; and (3) Norris’s Rule 60(b) 
motion was an impermissible second or successive habeas 
petition because it presented claims “identical to those in 
Norris’s prior habeas filing.” App. 17. We granted Norris a 
certificate of appealability.1  
II 
 The question presented is whether the District Court 
abused its discretion when it denied Norris’s Rule 60(b) 
motion by holding that Martinez does not apply to Norris’s 
case.2 
                                              
 1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 
and 2253. “We review a district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b) 
motion for abuse of discretion.” Morris v. Horn, 187 F.3d 
333, 341 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 2 We reach this question because, contrary to the 
District Court’s alternative holding, Norris’s Rule 60(b) 
motion was not an impermissible second or successive habeas 
petition under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). Although a 
Rule 60(b) motion that presents substantive claims for relief 
from a state conviction may run afoul of AEDPA’s strictures 
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A 
 Rule 60(b) authorizes a district court to grant a party 
relief from judgment for various specific reasons, as well as 
“any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
60(b)(6). Relief is appropriate under this catch-all provision 
only in “extraordinary circumstances where, without such 
relief, an extreme and unexpected hardship would occur.” 
Sawka v. Healtheast, Inc., 989 F.2d 138, 140 (3d Cir. 1993). 
The Supreme Court has said that “[s]uch circumstances will 
rarely occur in the habeas context,” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 
U.S. 524, 535 (2005), and that “[i]ntervening developments in 
the law by themselves rarely constitute the extraordinary 
circumstances required for relief under Rule 60(b)(6),” 
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 239 (1997). To determine 
whether this is an exceptional case in which a legal 
development supports Rule 60(b)(6) relief in the habeas 
context, we must examine how Martinez—the legal precedent 
relied upon by Norris—changed the law of habeas. 
 In general, “[a]n application for a writ of habeas 
corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the 
judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it 
appears that . . . the applicant has exhausted the remedies 
available in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(b)(1)(A). A habeas petition should therefore be denied 
if it raises claims that were procedurally defaulted in state 
court. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731–32 
(1991). This rule yields only when “the prisoner can 
                                                                                                     
on successive habeas petitions, Norris’s was not such a 
motion because it “merely assert[ed] that a previous ruling 
which precluded a merits determination was in error.” 
Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 532 n.4 (2005). 
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demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice . . . or 
demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a 
fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 750. 
 In Coleman, the Supreme Court held that attorney 
error during state collateral proceedings does not constitute 
cause to excuse the procedural default of a claim later raised 
in habeas. Id. at 752–53. The Court reasoned that “[t]here is 
no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction 
proceedings,” id. at 752 (citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 
U.S. 551 (1987)), and when a prisoner has no right to counsel 
he bears the risk of attorney error causing a procedural 
default, id. at 752–54 (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 
(1986)). 
 As noted herein, Martinez established an exception to 
the rule in Coleman by holding that attorney error in 
collateral proceedings may sometimes establish cause for the 
default of a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 
132 S. Ct. at 1315. The Martinez Court made clear, however, 
that this is a “narrow exception.” Id. Most importantly, the 
Court stated that the exception applies only to attorney error 
in initial-review collateral proceedings, not appeals from 
those proceedings. Id. at 1320. And the Court clarified that 
the exception applies only to cases in which the state formally 
requires prisoners to raise claims of ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel on collateral review rather than direct appeal.3 
                                              
 3 Dissenting in Martinez, Justice Scalia argued that this 
second limitation on the Court’s holding “lacks any 
principled basis” and predicted that it “will not last.” 132 S. 
Ct. at 1321 n.1. The following Term, the Court ruled in 
Trevino v. Thaler that Martinez also applies to situations in 
which a “state procedural framework, by reason of its design 
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Id. The reason for these caveats, it seems, is that the Court 
was concerned only about cases in which the error of a 
prisoner’s collateral review attorney results in “no state court 
at any level” hearing the prisoner’s claim and the claim being 
defaulted for purposes of habeas review in federal court. Id. at 
1316. Outside of these “limited circumstances,” Martinez 
made clear that Coleman remains the law. Id. at 1320. 
 We considered whether the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Martinez could support a habeas petitioner’s motion for 
relief from judgment in Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113 (3d Cir. 
2014). We held that “Martinez, without more, does not entitle 
a habeas petitioner to Rule 60(b)(6) relief,” but that Martinez 
could suffice in conjunction with equitable considerations—
for example, the merits of the prisoner’s underlying 
ineffective assistance claim and his diligence in seeking 
relief. Id. at 124–26. 
 In accordance with our guidance in Cox, Norris 
devotes most of his opening brief to arguing that Martinez 
and various equitable factors entitle him to relief from 
judgment here. The problem is that an unstated but critical 
premise of Cox and our other Rule 60(b) cases is that a 
change in the law doesn’t even begin to support a Rule 60(b) 
motion unless the change is actually relevant to the movant’s 
position. Cf. Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 
367, 388 (1992) (holding that a change in the law did not 
justify Rule 60(b)(5) relief because “the [new] case . . . was 
immaterial to petitioners”). And unlike in Cox, where the 
                                                                                                     
and operation, makes it highly unlikely in a typical case that a 
defendant will have a meaningful opportunity to raise a claim 
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal.” 
133 S. Ct. 1911, 1921 (2013). 
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attorney error cited to excuse the procedural default occurred 
at the initial-review collateral proceeding, the alleged error 
here occurred during Norris’s collateral appeal, when Wolfe 
opted not to present the speedy trial issue to the Superior 
Court. 
 Martinez made very clear that its exception to the 
general rule of Coleman applies only to attorney error causing 
procedural default during initial-review collateral 
proceedings, not collateral appeals. 132 S. Ct. at 1316, 1320; 
see also Arnold v. Dormire, 675 F.3d 1082, 1087 (8th Cir. 
2012). Because Norris’s claim of ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel was presented on initial collateral review and 
only waived on collateral appeal, we hold that Martinez does 
not justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6). 
B 
 Norris’s arguments to avoid this conclusion are 
unpersuasive. His primary contention is that his ineffective 
assistance claim was actually defaulted during the initial-
review PCRA proceeding because Wolfe inadequately 
presented the claim to the Court of Common Pleas. We have 
two problems with this argument. 
 First, the Martinez exception applies only when “an 
attorney’s errors . . . cause[] a procedural default in an initial-
review collateral proceeding,” 132 S. Ct. at 1318, and we’re 
unconvinced by Norris’s conflation of shoddy advocacy and 
procedural default. Second, given that the District Court 
concluded in its initial habeas determination that the waiver 
occurred on PCRA appeal and not on initial review, and that 
we cannot review that ruling in our review of a Rule 60(b) 
motion, we must accept as binding the District Court’s 
determination that the speedy trial issue was raised in the 
initial-review PCRA proceedings. See Browder v. Dir., Dep’t 
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of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 263 n.7 (1998) (“[A]n appeal from 
denial of Rule 60(b) relief does not bring up the underlying 
judgment for review.”). 
 Norris’s secondary argument is that the procedural 
default of his ineffective assistance claim must be excused 
because Wolfe abandoned him and was no longer acting as 
his agent when the claim was waived on PCRA appeal. He 
relies on Maples v. Thomas, in which the Supreme Court held 
that a procedural default may be excused “when an attorney 
abandons his client without notice, and thereby occasions the 
default.” 132 S. Ct. 912, 914 (2012); see also Holland v. 
Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 659 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring in 
judgment) (“Common sense dictates that a litigant cannot be 
held constructively responsible for the conduct of an attorney 
who is not operating as his agent in any meaningful sense of 
that word.”); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753 (“‘[C]ause’ under the 
cause and prejudice test must be something external to the 
petitioner, something that cannot fairly be attributed to 
him. . . .”). 
 As the Commonwealth points out, however, this 
argument made its debut in Norris’s reply brief and, “[a]s a 
general matter, the courts of appeals will not consider 
arguments raised on appeal for the first time in a reply brief.” 
Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 204 
n.29 (3d Cir. 1990). Moreover, Norris’s allegations against 
Wolfe fall short of abandonment in any event. He claims that 
Wolfe failed to keep him sufficiently informed about the 
Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss the PCRA petition, for 
example, and that Wolfe waived the speedy trial claim on 
PCRA appeal despite Norris’s instructions to the contrary. 
That is not abandonment. Cf. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 916–17 
(counsel changed jobs and dropped the representation without 
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notice); Holland, 560 U.S. at 652 (counsel failed to file the 
prisoner’s habeas petition on time and ignored his requests for 
communication “over a period of years”). We therefore reject 
Norris’s bid to reopen his habeas proceedings, and the order 
of the District Court will be affirmed. 
